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HE international monetary system has experi-
enced significant changes during the l970s. The
most dramatic of these has been the transformation
from a system of pegged exchange rates to one in
which central banks make no institutional com-
mitment to maintain a particular exchange rate.
Despite this change, central banks have been un-
willing, in general, to allow their exchange rates to
be completely market-determined and, conse-
quently, continue to hold foreign reserves. The
primary focus of this article is to analyze central
banks’ demand for foreign reserves in light of this
institutional change.
Central banks generally are thought to hold stocks
of foreign reserves so their economies can avoid
incurring the costs ofadjusting toevery’ international
imbalance that would be transmitted to the domestic
economy through changes in exchange rates. In par-
ticular, before March 1973, central banks partici-
pating in the Bretton Woods Agreement were com-
pelled to hold foreign reserves because they were
committed to intervene in foreign currency markets
when the value oftheir currencies moved outside a
predetermined range.
It was commonly believed that the demise of the
Bretton Woods Agreement and the concomitant
greater flexibility of exchange rates would reduce
central banks’ intervention in foreign currency
markets and, consequently, reduce their demand fbr
foreign reserves. That is, since perhaps the single,
most important reason for holding reserves had
diminished, cemitral banks would not he expected to
hold such large stocks offoreign reserves as they had
under the fixed exchange rate system. In spite ofthis
expectation, however, central banks have continued
to maintain sizable stocks of reserves since March
The atitho r would like to thank Jo tin B iIsOn, \ Iiehae I Rni’do a
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1973. This observation has led researchers to con-
dude that central banks have not changed appre-
ciably their demand fbr reserves with the transition
from a fixed to a floating exchange rate system.’
This conclusion, though potentially accurate, is
founded on a fi-amework ofanalysis in which foreign
reserves are considered by’ central banks asavery’
special type of asset — one held soie/rj to enable
them to intervene in foreign currency markets.
However, there is an alternative framework for
analyzing central bank behavior that predicts that,
even ifal I countries had adopted a completely clean-
floating exchange rate system in 1973, central banks
would have continued to hold a variety offinancial
assets, some ofwhich would have been classified as
foreign reserves under the previous fixed exchange
rate system. This article investigates which of these
competing frameworks better explains central bank
behavior since March 197.3.
T%VO ).4( )1~EI~SoF (~.F~NT ~rus~L iOi~~~IN K
BKH.AVI[OB.
To analy’ze whether or not central bank behavior
has changed significantly since the introduction of
flexible exchange rates, the demand for reserves
based on the intervention motive is compared with
an alternative one developed within an asset-choice
‘See, fbr example, Jaeoh A. Frenkel, ‘‘International Reserves:
Pegged Exchange Rates and Managed Float,’’ in Karl Bruoner
am I Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Public Polie ie in 0 pc0 Leo tic,‘tries.
Cai’negie-Rnehester Conference Series on Public Policy, sup—
plement to theJournci ifMotie to rq Eronn toirs, Vol unit’ 9 (1978),
pp. 111—40; II. Robert mleller ,oid Mohsin S.Kahn, ‘‘The Deniai,d
for International Reserves Under Fixed and Floating Fxelsange
Rates,’’ International Mon etan’ FiincI Staff Pope ,.s (Dece rnher
1978), pp. 623~49Nasser Saidi, ‘‘The Square—Root Law, Un-
certainty and linernati0!ial Reserves Un(ICr .AIte rn atsve Re’
ginie 5,’’Jon ~ 1 of ,
1
lonc(ant E(‘Oil (Alitj(’S (NIay 1981), pp. 271—90,
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framework.2 Only if the former explanation outper-
forms the latter for the floating period can one con-
clude that the changes in behavior since 1973 have
been relatively minor and inconsequential.
The first model is the standard one based on the
derived demand for foreign reserves for purposes of
intervening in foreign exchange markets. Since this
model has appeared frequently in the literature, its
characteristics are only briefly descrihed.~The
second model is based on asset-choice behavior and
has not been applied, until now, to the analysis of
foreign reserve demand. In this model, foreign re-
serves are treated as one ofseveral assets that appear
in a bank’s portfolio and are held for the general
conduct of monetary policy.
The J.pterz:~<•tsf.jnsj1dec01
The central bank intervention motive has been
thoroughly investigated. Earlier studies typically
have employed an optimizing approach in deter-
mining the demand for foreign reserves. One pro-
cedure is to find the stock of reserves at which the
marginal costs of holding them equal the marginal
benefits of using them to intervene in foreign
currency markets (i.e., the avoidance of costs asso-
ciated with the domestic economy having toadjust to
each external shock). A second procedure is con-
ducted in terms of welfare maximization under
uncertainty. In particular, a central hank’s demand
for foreign reserves is the result of its maximizing a
societal welfitre fi,nction which is a positive function
of the expected level ofreal income and a negative
function of its variability. Since the holding of for-
eign reserves diverts resources away from douiestic
uses, the larger the stock ofreserves, the lower the
expected level of real income. However, if no re-
serves are held, the domestic economy would have
to adjust to every external shock, resulting in more
real income variability.
Employing the intervention motive within this
framework, previous studies have identified four
major deternnnants of reserve demand: the vari-
ability of international payments and receipts, the
propensity to import, the opportunity cost ofholding
reserves and a scale variable measuring the size of
international transactions (usually the value of
imports). The variability of receipts and payments
measures the likelihood that external disequilib-
rium will occur, inducing the central bank to
intervene in foreign currency markets in order to
mitigate the impact of this disequilibrium on
domestic markets. The larger the variability of a
country’s receipts and payments, the more suscep-
tible is that country to external disequilibrium;
consequently, the larger is the optimal stock of
reserves desired for purposes of intervention.
There are two possible rationales fbr including the
propensity to import as a determinant of reserve
demand. First, the average propensity to import can
be considered a measure of the degree of openness
in an economy, thus indicating the degree to which
the economy is vulnerable to an external disequilib-
rium. A second, alternative rationale sterns fromn
the Keynesian model of an open economy in which
an external disequilibrium could he corrected,
without changing the exchange rate, by a change in
output in proportion to the foreign trade multiplier.
This output cost of adjustment could be avoided if
the central hank used its stock offoreign reserves to
finance (orto sterilize) the disequilibrium. Since this
output cost is directly related to the size of the
foreign trade mm,ltiplier, audi since this multiplier is
inversely relatedi to the marginal propensity to
import, the output cost of not holding sufficient
reserves necessary to avoidl this adjustment and,
thus, the central bank’s dlemandl for reserves, must
also he inversely related to the marginal propensity’
to import. Because the marginal propensity’ to import
is difficult tomeasure, most studhes have substituted
the average propensity’ as a proxy’. However, if the
average propensity to import is employed both asa
proxy’ forthe marginal propensity and as a measure of
21
‘See Russell S. Buyer and David Laidler, “A Comment on the
Frenkel Paper,” in Bruaner and Meltzer, eds.,Public Policies in
Open Economies’. pp 141—43,
‘Examples of this and similar models include Peter B. Clark,
‘Demand for International Reserves: A Cross—Country Anal-
ysis, Canadian Joncoal of Econoiuics (November 1970), pp.
577—94; Peter B. Clark, “Optinsum International Reserves and
the Speed ofAdjustment,‘‘Jonrim
1
(ifPolitical Leo ii o my (March!
April1970), pp. 356-76;T.J. Cou,vhene:rndC. M.Yous’sef “The
Demand for Interriat ional Reserves,’’ Joncuai of Political
Econommiy (August 1967). pp 404’13; Jacob A. Frenkel, ‘‘The
Demand for International Rescues by Developed and Less—
Developed Countries,’’ L’coriomica (February 1974), pp. 14—24;
Frenkel, “International Reserves: Pegged Fxcliange Rates and
Managed Float’’; H. Robert mleller, ‘‘Optimal International
Reserves,’ Economic Jonroof (June 1966), pp. 296~3 11; Heller
and Klsan,“The Demand furInternational Reserves Under Fixed
and Floating Exchange Rates’’; F. Steb Hipple, Theflistu i’botee
App cooc/i to (he 1)emaudfor in Icii matb itt)! Re,veit:es’, Princeton
~t,idies in Intern ati0 isa
1
Fii,arsc’e No. 35 (Priiseetun U,s iyersits’
Press, 1974); NIilton A. Ivoba, ‘‘Demand for International Re—
serves in Less—Developed Countries’. A Distributed Lag Speei—
fication,’’ TbeBce Ofre ofLeo nato ic.s ti i,d S to ii ,stic’s(Asmgu st 1976),
PP. 351-55; Michael C. Kelly, ‘‘The Demand for International
Reserves,’’ TImc’ American Ft’oiio in ic Beeiere (Scptcml icr 1970),
pp. 655—67; and Saidi, ‘‘The Sqinu’e—Rnut Law, Uncertainty arid
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openness, the signofits impacton reservedemandis
ambiguous.
Since centralbanks do nothold an infinitestock of
foreignreserves, there mustbe somecost associated
with holding them. Conceptually, from society’s
point ofview, holdingforeignreserves representsan
allocation of scarce resources away from domestic
uses. Presumably, for every dollar invested in its
stock of foreign reserves (through its central bank),
society foregoes a dollar of domestic capital forma-
tion. Consequently, a rate of return on domestic
capital istheappropriate measureofthe opportunity
cost to society of its central bank’s stock of foreign
reserves. On the margin, the optimal stock of re-
serves is that level at which the cost of holding
reserves equals the marginal benefits provided by
that stock of reserves. Few studies have included
explicitly a measure of opportunitycost. Moreover,
those that have included it have not found it to be
empirically significant4 The hypothesized reason
for the overall poor performance of this variable is
the strong positive relationship between itand the
supply of reserves. In particular, the higher the
opportunity costofholding reserves, thehigher also
the domesticrateofreturn on financialcapitalwhich
motivates capital inflows and, ceteris paribus, in-
creases the supply ofreserves. As described below,
interestrate differentialsare employedas anattempt
to circwnventthis problem.
Finally, the scale variable and the demand for
foreign reserves shouldbe positivelyrelated. Infact,
if the value ofinternational transactions is used as
the scale variable, the elasticity of reserve demand
with respect to the value of international transac-
tions should be between 0.5 and 1.0.~
An Asset-Choice Model
In formulating an asset-choice model of central
bankbehavior, foreignreserves are treatedsimply as
one type ofassetin acentralbank’s portfolioheldto
enable the central bank to conduct domestic mone-
tarypolicy. Itis assumed thatthe primary objective
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of monetary policy is to provide an economic en-
vironment conducive to the stable, noninflationary
growthof real output To this end,the centralbank
affects the level ofcommercial bank reserves (and,
subsequently, the money supply)throughactivity in
government securitiesand fbreigncurrency markets
and by making loans directly to the banking sector.
Consequently, to conduct monetary policy ade-
quately, its portfolio should contain at least three
assets: foreign reserves, government securities and
claims on commercial banks.
A central bank typically confronts two types of
economic phenomena — expected and unexpected
— towhich itmakespolicyresponses.Inlightofthis,
the specific modeling of the portfolio decision-
makingprocessofacentralbankinvolves separating
its assets into two categories: committed and un-
committedassets. In responseto its anticipations of
prospectiveevents, acentral bankcommits a portion
of its portfolio so that it can pursue its monetary
policy objective within this “expected” economic
environment.
However, since a central bank also is faced with
unanticipatedeconomicevents towhich itmaywish
to respond, itmustholdadditional reservesto enable
itto respondto these “unexpected” occurrences (or
shocks) aswell.These“precautionary”reservesmay
or may not be used for the conduct of monetary
policy in any specific period, while the committed
portion, is, by definition, fully involved in the
monetary control process. Consequently, a central
bank is concerned only with theyield (cost) on the
potentially idle, precautionary portion. That is, a
central bank’s demand for the assets that form the
committed componentishypothesized to beinsensi-
tive to theirrelative yields, whereasthecomposition
ofthe precautionary (or uncommitted) reserve com-
ponent is hypothesizedto besensitive to changes in
relative asset yields.
To formalize this discussion of central bank be-
havior, assume that acentralbank(subjectto certain
constraints) desires to maximize its “ability” to
respond to unanticipated events. It accomplishes
this by maximizing theuncommitted portion of its
portfolio.8 This can be summarized with the fol-
‘A model assuming a wealth-maximizing objective of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System has been showntobe abetterpredictor
of Fed behavior than the traditional model of the Fed as an
automaton reacting only topolitical pressures. See Mark Toma,
“Inflationary Biasofthe Federal ReserveSystem:A Bureaucratic
Perspective,” unpublished manuscript (California State Uni-
versity, Nortbridge, 1981). Consequently, applying a similar
assumption to othercentral banks is not without precedent.
4See, Eor example, Courchene and Youssef, “The Demand for
International Reserves”; lyoha, “Demand for International
Reserves in Less-Developed Countries”; Kelly, “The Demand
for International Reserves”; and Saidi, “The Square-Root Law,
Uncertainty, and International Reserves.”
‘See Ernst Baltensperger, “The Precautionary Demand for
Reserves,” The American Economic RevIew (March 1974), pp.
205-10; andJ. H. C. Olivera, “The Square-RootLaw ofPrecau-
tionary Reserves,” Journal of Political Economy (September/
October 1971), pp. 1095-1104.
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lowing objective function:
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which isthesystem represented by (3) in thetext. Itcan he shown
that the own—price elasticity csf demand for asset •i is
y~(1-/3~)
8’) ~ = —1 *
and that the Allen partial elasticity ofsubstitution between assets
i and j is
Xi 7~ 7j II
(9’) ~ = ~ki Pt(çT~.
For (x( — 7k~> 0 all assets are Flicksian substitutes.
‘The value of 7k is determined hy tlsose variahles that influence
each country s monetary policy decisions (e.g., economic activ—
ity, 1 inemploysn ent, inflation). Certainly, interest rates may I
included in this group of detersssiiants. 1-lowever, since 7k ~
estimated, the hvpothe sized interest insensitivity of a portion ofa
central hank’s portfolio can he easily tested. Specifically, if 7k is
statistically significant,the hypothesis that acentral bankholds a
portion of its portfolio for reaso, is other than relative vie IrIs
cannot be rejected Also, the hvpothe sis that on,, part of the
portfolio is sensitive to change s in interest rates can I Se tested by
testing the statistical significance of $.
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remainder of its balance sheet (TA — I y~
j=1
which the hank allocates to the various assets (in
proportions denoted by ni,) according to relative
yields in a manner that maximizes its objective
fiinction.’
/3 13z
(1) F(xs x,,) = U (xk — 7k) A
k=1
where Xk = asset k’s maturity value at the end of
the time period,




— 7k = the uncommitted or precautionary
value of asset k,
hi = asset k’s share of the uncommitted
portfolio,
Ii
and I fit 1,
k=1
which the central bank maximizes subject to the
following balance sheet accounting constraint:
n -




ri the yield on asset k within the period,
TA = the present value of the assets in the
portf0liO,~
The resulting system ofasset-demand equations is
as follows:’
/ n
(3) xk=yk± ~TA— I y•jyj)
j=1
n
It is clear from equation 3 that a central hank’s
demandforeach asset in its portfolio has two primary
components. The first is the required or connnittecl
portion (yk). which is determined regardless ofyields.
The second, or precautionary, component is the
‘All assets are assomedto mat,ire in orre Pcrion, hut lange s—Iived
as sets enold be included without a substantive change in the
analysis. Also, since tlse issue investigated here is a central
hank’s alloe;-ition of a 4 Cen portfolio ass’u ng ‘aria, is assets, the
determination ofthe size oftheportfolio in any tiisie period (TA
5
)
is not considered. For souse insights intothisqisestion, see Tosna,
lnflatirsnarv Bias of the Federal Reserve Sy steu,.’’
‘More li,rnsall v, the ss-stein of demand equations represented hy
equation 3 isderived by setting up the Lsgrangcan function and
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The functional fonn of central hank demand for
foreign reserves fbr the purpose ofexchange market
intervention is a familiar one:1°
(4) in R~= a
0
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reserve position in the IN-IF at the end of
time period t,
= imports of i during t.
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foreign reserves in t,
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(All variables denominated in domestic currency units are
converted into U.S. dollars using the cnn-of-period cx-
change rate.)
Theuse ofimports as a scalevariable and the average
propensity to import as an indicator of openness
have been discussed above. The trend-adjusted vari-
anceofcountry i’s stock offoreign reserves isa proxy
for the variability of international receipts and ex-
penditures. It is calculated using a method similar to
Frenkel’s.h1
The measure of opportunity cost employed is the
ratio ofthe discount rate in each countsy to the three-
month Eurodollar deposit rate. For a given portfolio
of assets, the discount rate represents a measure of
the foregone earnings of central banks as a result of
holding assets in the form of foreign reserves; the
tlsree-n,onth Eurodollar deposit rate is a measure of
the income earned from invested foreign reserves.
‘°Sce,for exaniplc, Frenkel, ‘‘International Reserves‘‘;and Fleller
and Khan, ‘‘The Den,and liar International Reserves Under
Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates.’’
n Frenkel, ‘‘international Reserves,’’ p. 136. Ussr measure ofvari-
ability is actually Frenkel‘5 divided hr the number ofdegreesof
freedon, (14 is, tl,is case); i.e.,
t— 1
0~
iI= I (Ri,,, — Ri~m~ I —
is,
where m ,,, is tbsc slope of a lissear tisne—trend equation e sti—
mated over the period t-15 to t-i.
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The ratiortale for this is that central banks Isold most
of their foreign reserves in the form of U.S. dollars.
Instead of holding idle balances of dollars, central
banks typically invest their reserves in some short-
term asset in order to maintain a relatively high de-
gree ofliquidity; hence, the ratio (or log difference)
measures the net foregone yield. Consequently, an
appropriate yield on invested foreign reserves is a
sisort-term interest rate on dollar-denominated
assets.’2
The sample employed consists of seven coun-
tries fbr the time period 1/1964 to IV/1979.ma The
countries included are Denmark, France, West
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden. The United States is not included because
itis considered tobe the primary supplier of foreign
reserves. The data set consists of a pooling ofcross-
section and time-series observations.
The possibilities that country-specific variation
mayhe present and that a lagged adjustment process
may exist are provided for in the following assumed
autoregressive error structure:
(5) u~= p miiys ±
t
im’
where Pi = autocorrelation paranseter for country i,
= white noise random error.
Including a separate autocorrelation parameter for
each country captures the country-specific variation
‘
5
1’he discount rate is empl rayed becassse, eyes, th nsugli it is not
market—determined, its nsoyen,ent closely parallels n,arket rates
in the countries in tlse sample. Also, since n,ost ofthe central
banks studied use imstcrest rates as a mechanism of monetary
control. the discnsus,t rate reflects conditiosss in the respective
credit markets. Government sec ,~i ritics usssrkets are sot sssiff-
ciently developed in all nsf the countries to he able to use an
interest rate from that asarket. The Eurodollar nheposit rate is
mssed as the yield on foreigss reserve stocks even though other
cnrrencie s are Iseld as foreign reserves mid evesi though sonic
eesstral hasiks have refrained generally fron, issvesting in the
Eurodollar market directly. The jsistiflcations liar this are: (a) the
U.S. dollar isstill the n,s~or reserve currency, comprising 66to 75
percent ofthe foreign reserves held by central banks, (hi) some
cesstral hatsks do invest nlirecthy its the Euronlollarsssarket tvh,i Ic
others invest indirectly using the Bank for I nte rssatiomsal
Settlemes,ts asas, isstennediary and (c) the nsajor alterr,atiye trs
the Eurodollar n,arket is the market liar U.S - Treasury hills.
However, since the three—nsonth Eurodollar i-ate and the tlsree—
nsonth Treasury bill rate move very closely together, they
yield virtually inlentical results when employed individssally
in the estin,ation of both the intervention and the asset—choice
models. Finally, the ratio has been criticized as simply a proxy
forthe forward discount or prenssuns on the curreiscies inchtided.
However, when the cocered ratio is substituted for the uss—
eoverenl one, mso sigssificant qualitative cliasiges occur.
“TIse saniple period extends to l\-’/198f) for Japan, West Germany
and the Neth,erlas,ds. Gross ds,mcstic product data were not
a~-ailah,le for tlse other countries in tbse sample for thsis extended
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Table 1
Estimation of Intervention Model
111964 111973 III 1973-IV/1979’
Standard Standard
Parameter Estimate error Estimate error
ag 525 420 1102 503
a 883 066 .644 069
a2 — 614 072 — 289 070
a 064 .023 113 038






Nethe lands 92 54
Norway 90 88
Sweden 96 74
N 259 N 187
RMSE 118 RM$E 14t
R
2 betweenactua fl between a tuab
values and p edtcted value and predicted
values 96 v lees 87
‘The amp e pe sod extend tolV/t980 Ior Japan, Wes Germ n and the Netherlands
Signitcant y diffe nt1 cmzero at the 5 p roent level.
and also provides a means of introducing dynamic the Smithsonian Agreement, that is, between the
behavior into the model.14 second and third quarters of 1973.16
Finally, the date of the switch from fixedto floating The results obtained from estimating the solution
exchange rates must be identified. Since the data are of equations 4 and 5 over the two time periods in-
pooled, it is extremely difficult to identify the break dicated above are reported in table 1. Several dif-
point as occurring at a specific point in time. It is ferences in the estimated relationsisips for the two
likely the switch occurred overdifferent intervals for periods-are apparent. First, the import elasticity (aj)
each country analyzed.’5 Experimentation with in the fixed exchange rate period is significantly
various breakpoints-around the March 1973 collapse largerthan that in the floating rate period, In fact, the
of the Smithsonian Agreement yielded no single importelasticityinthefixedperiodisnotstatistically
quarter as the most likely break point for all of the different fron, one,which indicates that central bank
countries in the sample. Consequently, the break is holdings of foreign reserves do not exhibit econ-
simply- assumed tocoincide with the actual failure of omies of scale during that period. Second, the mag-
nitude ofthe response to changes invariability (a3) is
“For further explasiatinsn, see Jobsn F. U. Bilson and Jacols A.
FrenkeI. ‘‘Dyna,,sic Amhj ustmesit and the Dens,and for Is,terr,a— - -- - — -. - / ,, ‘°ll,isch,nnt c is gis,es sIhs supports ni hi I’ scsskn I Intcris ,tsom, il tsnnil Resn ss t s NBFR \% ork,,s~ P sperN o 101 t Nos cinher Rn senes PP 124 25 sod hi Hehim snd Kbin 1hi Dt n, md
i9 e9), pp i--i; and hiclhei anch Kbsan, The Dcns,and fnsr intcr- for lnternatios,ah Re serves Us,clerFixenl and Flnsating Exchange
nitson sh IL its’. Cs Listlet F sxenl snd Flu stsssg F id, tryst Rstes Rates pp 637 39 The sc len unsu of tlst hat ik pdssnst is shsu
p. 63i - As pointeni out hi- I-idler annl Kh,as,, when equatron 5 ss -- - . -
ens,str isised hi this tsr cm s 5st, to ch,oosc tbse s sssie hics kpusistfir tihiststuted sntu equation 4, the result is ohseri-atmos,alh y equlv— .- -
c sch modn I so th it tIm perfos in siscc C 50 hi cnssssptsrd niCr
alent to as, adaptisc-expectations or ass ci ior-heausnng pmocess. inhenticah sassmplc periods- Also, liar each ,,,onlel, the l,ypothesis
‘‘This is supported h-i- Frenkel, ‘‘bsstemnatin,,al Reserves,’’ pp. that the estis,,ated parameters hefiase this poisit are equal to
122—25; and Sainhi, ‘‘The Square-Root Law, Uncertainty and those after this point is re~ectemlat the 5 percent cm,s,fidencc
Is,ters,atinss,al Reserves,’’ pp. 280—83. level.
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larger under floating tl,an under fixed rates, This is
somewhat paradoxical since one snight expect that
the is,creased exchange rate flexibility duris,g the
floatis,g rate period wotsld serve as a buffer as,d,
cos,sequentl~’, reduce ces,tral bas,ks’ s’esponse to
cl,anges in variability. ~
Tl,ird, the sensitivity of central banks’ reserve
holdis,gs to is,terest rate changes under fixed rates
(a~) is insignificas,t, a result similar to tl,at of other
studies,18 Alternativeb-, usider floating rates. central
banks- are fhnnd to respos~clis, a significant and con-
ceptual h- consistent n,anner to changes in interest
rates. Whesscon,pared with those of previous studies,
these results suggest tI,at an interest rate differesitial
is abetter measure of the opportunity’ cost ofholdis,g
reserves. Finally’, aconiparison ofthe intercepts (acj)
suggests that central banks are holdis,g larger stocks
of foreign reserves, osi ax-erage, is, the floating rate
period1 than they- did in, the fixed rate period, inch—
catistg that they have actual ly- added to their stocks
during the floating period.
j/?4y,~-pJ_~ UPS-Cc (it.~!.
To estis,,ate the system of asset—den,ancl equations
represented by equation 3, it was assumed tl,at
normally distributed randon, errors enter additively-
with zero s,,ean and constant variance. .ks a result of
introducing a randoni component in this snarsrser, the
sum of the error terms across all equatiosis in the
systes,, must equal zero if the systesn is to be cos,—
sistent.’9 This restriction on the error structtsre, by-
introdsscing linear dependence across equations, has
at least two isnportant isTsphications for estin,ation,
First, single—equation estimating techniques are irs—
appropriate. Efficient estimation requires the use of
asystem technique. Secos,cl, the covariance snatrix of
the es,tire system is sis,gular. Because of tl,is, a full—
‘‘Fresskel, ‘‘lister,satio,sah Rest-ri-es.’’ p. 120, also ul,tais,ecl this
res,iht; I, owe s-er, S aidi, ‘‘TIsc Sql s are—Rots t Law, U 55cc’ stai5,tv ass
Isite rs,,stiOs, nih Reses’.es,’’ p. 285, louisd sosal her respcsss sc s to




infk,rn,atiosi techniqsse cannot be esnployed on the
es,tire system of 51 asset—den,as,cl equatios~ssisnul—
taneouslv becansse tl~einversion of this covarsas,ce
matrix is required during the estimation proct-sss.
Consequently, only 51—1 equations cas~he estin,atecl
sisntsltas,eously.20
The cossntries and tin,e periods employed l~ere are
ides,tical to those used iss estisnating the intervention
s,,odel. Tl,e, assets of tile ces~tral banks of these
consntries are aggregated into three categories: for-
eign reserves, claims on governn,ent and claisns Os,
coms,,ercial baslks. The is,terest rates used for tl,cse
asset groups are tile three—mos,th Eurodollar deposit
rate (for foreigs, reserves), short—tern, government
bond yield is’ country i (for claims on gov-erns,,ent)
an,cl the discount rate in, i (for claisus on cosns,,ercial
has,ks). The three—month Ensrodollar rate is used
here fbr tl,e sasne reason it was usedl is, theestimation
of the intervention snodel. Also, a dy’nas,,ic specifi-
cation is employ-ed to capture lagged adjustsnent of
the committed parameters (yk) hy allowing then~to
vary’ over time. This dynamic feature is is,trocluced
into the systen~hy assuming tl,at the cos,,mitted
level ofeach asset is a fnss,ction ofthe total l,olding of




with C) c Ok ~ 1 for all k. The paran~eterOk reflects a
proportioslal relationship i,etwees, the con,mitted
level of asset k is, ti,e ctsrres,t period to tl,e total
i,olding of that asset in the preceding period.
Finally, tile date of the switch frosn fixed to floating
exchas,ge rates is the sasne as isi estis,,ating the isi—
terves,tion model.
Substituting equatios, 6 is~to equatiom, 3 and recog—
nizing tl,at m,=3 in this case, the resulting s steni of











= (Jo xo~s± ~ ~ —
‘Forthis’ s vstess, of’ asset—dc-sts,s,,cb equatiosss reprc’s es,ts’ch liv eqitnt—
ioss 3 Ins h,e essn sists,s it, tlsc- valcse of th,c’ c-stissssited pos’tlo I its ss,u si
eq Is’s
1
tl~ / vnshtic csf th, e (Sn-’ton / ixsrtf cshits. TIiis c’csssrIitiosi isuplit’s
thsat the crrnr tcrsims nil.’rssss nil I II 555set—dc’snanci c-sinsatm sss suns
sos is tts zero, Tlsat is, the errsSr teiss,sacross eq csnsti usis as-c line,srh y
dc/J)e ssche,st nilsd tbsus, hsv the fits itics,, ccsrichatenl. It cots Id nih so lie
argns r’ch thsat, liar thiis ,snahv si s, thsc dr sssasschs It Sr as sc’ts art’ ccsr—
s-c’ hater1 regai-dhe ss tsf this’ csssssiste nscv ecs sschi tics mm, Is s particular, ii
thse inspact of Inrefgn cnicl missige 551,srket isites-i-c, olinss opts rs tIme
chosssc’stic sssussev supply is sterilized leg-, tb,rssssgb an cslfsettisig
sale ssr p0 rchs ‘tsr- of govers, 5’cm,! se-cs tntit’s), I Ise s I fiarei gs s t-x—
chinsssge bsolcliii gs ,sssch gcsver,, ssin’s, t stenrity huh cli ss gs sirs’ nccc’s —
‘sri hv 0egativel v c:urrc-I atc’ch -
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incnn Expeisd itu re Svs tc/mu,’ Fconosssc ts-ic-n (Octuh5cr 1969).
pp. 611—28 - TI5ev prcsvc’ th,at ii’ a InsIl—iii Esrss,,sti on, ussixi sssusss—
I ikc’hi hscsuch c/sti 5,atics’s proct’disrc’ is essupIovech, thin’ c’stis,,,ii ccl
pssrasslc’ters sire issvariasst tss whichever nm—I c’qssatiosis are
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Table 2
Estimation of Asset-Choice Model
I 1964 II 19 3 Ell/197 IV.1979
S ndar Start ard
Par me er Esttmat a ror S mate erre
987 2 983 01
if 893 02 1001 018
Ii 1 005 017 .897 049
536 048 261 .038
32 035 213 047
11 IS 04 526 058
RMSE o equatton 7 1 697 RMSE of equatson 7 I 1 404
A between actual and fl2 b tween actual an
predic ed values for predicted values o
equation 7 I9 8equation 71 99
‘Thesample period extends to hV11980 for Japan, West Germany and the Ne herlands
‘The subscrip s 1 2 and 3 refertothe three asset categor as. foreign reserves claimson govern
men and chasms on commercial banks respectively
Ssgnsficantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
wl,ere x~,
5
= the value of coisntrv i’s hsolding of asset other hand, the estimated committed parameters fbr
at the end of time period t, claims on government (02) and fbr ehain,s on coin-
1 mercial banks (è,) have changed significantly- with
v
10
= f~’ the change in regimes.22 Furthermore, th,e per-
‘s. centage of their discretionary portfbhio that central
= the yield on asset) in counts-y i finn, lie- bas,ks heidi in the fonn of foreign reserves (rns) fell
ginssing tss essd of tin,e pcrnod t, significantly from the fixed to the floating period.
TA51
= th,e value of l’s portlkshmcs at hegislning Thse sensitivity ofthe demansci for foreign reserves to
of pericsd t. changes in interest rates (as measured by- the abso—
-- = errcsr tersui lute value ofthe price elasticity of demand) also fell
-- fron~ .563 in the fixed rate period1 to .289 in the
Table 2 presents the results of estinnating ti,e above floathng rate period1. Nonetheless, tile fact that this
systesss on,itting equation 7,321 A finlh-infon,lation, percentage is statistically significant in both periods
n,aximun,—hikehih,ood techniqnse is used to obtain indicates tl~atreserve holdings are at least partially
efficient estimates. sensitive to changes in interest rates,
All paramlieter estimates are statistically sigs,ificant Takem~together. the changes in~Os andh ~s over tile
and within conceptually acceptable ranges ofvalues. two periods shedhsosne light on why Hehler anti Khan
As before, differences between time periods, hut consistently ocerpredict central bank den,and for
also across assets, are readhily apparent. In particular, foreign reserves dhtlring the floating periocl.2nI ntheir
the estimated comss,ittecl parameter fhr fhreign re- modheh, central banks hold foreign reserves solely to
serves (01) is relatively- constant across time periods, intervene in foreign exchange n,arkets. Alterna-
im,dilcating that central banks have not alteredi tl~e~ tively, in the asset—cl,oic’e modeh, interventios, is
cosni,litted portion of ti,eir foreign reserves in the simply one of several n,otives (where th~e committech
move froni fixed to floating exchas,ge rates. On the paran~eter n,easures the dlen,and for reserves for
~s Fice ptfinp~ anch its vansalice, all pamssacters ai,d thsc~s r vnsr~as, cc s
22
Eyenth isis gls irs ths s- fixed period as,d ~ isu thue licsati sug periss d
irt stun itcch diii c thi Suits ~ p1
= I di = I Ps — fib inn] sic pc itcs thus, s lthc coins ptss ii hisast of c ich) s,c,tht I ss
-- - k -- - sigs’ ificas,thv greater than 1 is, a statistic-al sess se -
n (di
t
- n (Pm’ \ Is)~o)+2cu (/
3
s flu Thst snssc sessshts
ns those rcpcsstc dsitu oh,tssssc ci ithuc sic sthmi r c qu ilIum, 7 1 (Si
72
255li lIt i usc
1
KIm us Fh,c 1)s uss mid Issr Isits so itsoim il Rcirs-irs
(isustcad oh 7,3) was clsnls,ted. U- icIer Fixed and Flcsnutsssg F,xclsas,gc Rates, Isp, 6-39-43.
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Table 3
Partial Elasticities of Substitution
Asset 1/1964-111973 lll/1973—IV 1979’
Foreign reserves 116 028
and claims
on government
Foreign reserves 031 076
and claims on
commer sal bank
Claims on government .065 094
and claims on
commerc al banks
The sample period extends to IV’1980 to Japan Wes





Level 788 4 577
Log level 0139 0199
Asset-choice model
(Equatuon 71)
Level 486 1 970
Log level 0144 0167
‘The ample period extends to IV 1960 for Japan West
Germany and the Netherlands
fwo in -thods of conip triton aie esiiplo~ di:Th first
is the residual vaniance crites ion dcx C lopedh bx
Th il.2~The use of th residual v-mrianc csiterios,
mv nix s calculating a re idu-tl —x Iriance stiniat
(error sum of squares dhvidied by des’recs of fi ceciosn)
for ichi mochel asuci selectuu th nuodcl x ith the
smallest esichsal xariance 26 Since thc int rx ention
model is estimated is, log—i id form and the asset—
choice snodi I is slot ther sidu ti—x asianee estimates
fronu the txx o misodel s are muot directly comparable. ‘in
make these -stimates conuparabie either tIn r —
sidiuals of the sth ~ated unterx ention model hix to
lie transfos mcdl fion, logo ithm s to hexeis or thc i —
idhuals of the stis,,atecl ‘155 t—choice model haxe to
b ts ansformed fronu icx is to log-irithms.27 Table 4
presents tile r suIt of both of these trans fonnatsons.
E‘wept for th logarithmic specification estimated
n-icr the fixed rate period the asset—choice modc I
ippears to outp rform the intes vention modeh.
less ri Tisc-il, Frisld’iJ)Is-s ofFcssOOmO c-tess-s (jsih us Wi I c-v asic] Scsms s,
Inc., 1971), pp. 513-45. 553-54.
tm0
Th,e selection csf tise specificatious ivith, tue s srsahi est s’esiclual
s-arias,c-c isju ss tifit-cl liv tisc ñii honis, gps’sspsisiti cii,: if’ tIm, ccirrect
~ sec:ific-muticiii has issuc:s,s-reiatc-d ciisturi,as,s:cs sv itIs zerci Inc’as, as,cI
ccisu stasst van auuce amid if thue expiasmats sry variahles are sits us—
stochastic:, tile resiclrsal—variance estisssator of tl,e csmrrect
spccificatiosu has ass expectatiosu that is “ever Isurger tim,, that of





Tl sss trasss fors,,ati ci si is acesisn~ iii 5Isecl liv c’ossvcrti mug I hse aetna I
amid tI,e ~u red ic-tc’ i s-als me s fin us thc- level (I~sgai mit[us, ie) 55uec’ ifi—
cation iiito loga ritlsius (miii ti—i usgs), cal c-i_sI atiisg th,r’ snsus s,fsqs saneci
cic-viatioims csh’ tI,e ps-edieted val sic Isom,, tIme nets sai. tImes, adj us st—
i mug for degrees of fleesits’s
purposes of intervention).24 Even though this rela-
tionship appears to he relatively stable across tin,e
(in the asset-choice nuodhel), overlooking tile sig-
nifican,t chechis,e is, the percentage of the precau-
tionary portfnho heidi in the krnl offoreign reserves
by basing predictions on a interv’es,tion model
should lead to an overpredictiosu of reserve cieu,,and,
ceteris parilius.
One final questiosu ren,ains to lie answered: Are
the assets in central banks’ portfolios close substi-
tutes forcads other? To answer this question, partial
elasticities of substitution are calculated for each of
the asset pairs over each time period. Since these
elasticities are fus,ctinns, inter alia,of thecommitted
and us,cos,,mnittedhlevels ofeachasset, the elasticities
reportedl are evaluated using the mean holdings of
the relevant assets (table 3). Gives, the relatively
high estimatedivalues ofthe conlmnittedi parameters, These results, however, must lie qualified. Tile
it is not too surprising to find that none (if tile- ~ss-sets residual—varias,ce method presupposes that one (if
are close substitutes, the specifications is the correct one, a sonlewilat
presumptuous supposition. Also, in this case tile two
tim?af.ii.UC A.b(tsties of 1:/s.c.i .1 vu iviooets
The ultimate test (ifa structssral model is how well
it preshcts behavior. This sectios, comnpares the pre—
dlictive abilities of the two m,,odhels described above.
24()nc nay- is,fc r tismut, iinec- the assset—eli o ic-c- so csdc- I dos-s us cit cx—
5
iiit-it]v eosltad ml cxiilanatnrv van mu]ii c-s thumit mepies emst tIme ii,—
tervesutioii ssssstms’e, it is fus,mdaosesutahlv sssissjieeillerl. however,
tisee stiissmstio si ssf tlut, assc t—ehoicc laos heI ch emil-iv ii,niic:sste s ti smut
thus- lou-cigo re-serve cit-n, asum(is of’ c-c-i, trail hmsss k s are sc-i’sitiye to
vicmi s on cstlmen missets is, thut- I r portfcs lics. Si rice th~ e isste ri-esstiois
us scicleh igmuuss-e s tlsc-se explas,atss my vaumi ash sic’s, it is al so l’s mu udmu—
oieotmuhiv nuisspceihed, Cnss,sesjoesstiv, fustusre nuscaurc:ls slicimslri
[us- clinc-etc-cl at c:ss mushii using tise featmssc-s ni haitI s ci I thsc-sr mis side Is Is,
uieeiivenri-eel Iy ml c-cus trash luau!, k’s sir- mmii mc
1
him fssrt-i gsu rest, mvi’s -
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modelscompared are non-nested; that is, the models
have separate sets ofexplanatory variables such that
one model cannot be obtained from the other, Con-
sequently, the conventional use of summary statis-
tics and F-tests to discriminate among alternatives
can he misleading and even inappropriate.28
The second method is an extension ofthe Coxtest
developed by Pesaran and Deaton.29 This procedure
for testing non-nested hypotheses is not subject to
either of the above qualifications necessary for in-
terpreting the results of the residual-variance
method. In particular, Pesaran and Deaton’s pro-
cedure does not employ a single maintained (null)
hypothesis. (No model is considered a priori to be
the correct one.) The alternative models are anal-
yzedone at atime. Oneby one,each is assumed to be
the correct one.) The alternative models are ana-
lyzed one at a time. One by one, each is assumed to
be the correctmodel (null hypothesis); thealternative
has been observed. The notion ofabsolute goodness
of fit plays no role in this procedure. In fact, the
possibility exists that all competing models may be
rejected. This is not the case for conventional testing
procedures.°°
The test statistics calculated with the intervention
model and edjuation 7.1 of the asset-choice model,
respectively, as the null hypothesis are reported in
table 531 Underthe null hypothesis, this teststatistic
is asymptotically distributed as a normal random
variable with zero mean and unit variance. The
28
See M. H. Pesaran, “On the General Pmohhen, of Model Sehee-
tion,”The Reeiew ofEeoumommsic: Studies (April1974), pp. 153-71.
29
D. R. Cox, “Tests of Separate Families of Hypotheses,” in
Proceed/lumps of flue Fonet/s Berkeley Sy,uposis, sum on ,%Io f/se—
sucztica/ Stcs tist,c,s timid Probability (University of Caliform,ia
Press, 1961), pp. 105-123; M. H. Pesaran andA. S. Deaton, “Test-
ing Non-Nested Noruhnear Regression Models,” Fcoumosuuetrica
(May 1978), pp. 677-94.
Table 5
Statistics for Testing Hypotheses
Involving Non-Nested Models
Ho interventuon rnodei
HA Asset-cho’ce model (Equation 7 1)
Period —. Test statistic
11964-11,1973 18 36
lH’1973”IV,1979’ ,. 22Sr
H2 Asset-choice model lEquaton 7 1)
HA Interventon model
Period Test statistic
I’ 1954-111973 ‘ 0.85
Ill 1973-iV!197W 075
‘The sample period extends to lV’1980 for Japan. West
Germany and the Netherlands
statislscally different f’om zero at the 5 percent level
suit’ are unambiguous. When confronted with the
‘dataandtheasset-choice model as an alternative, the
intervention model must be rejected. Alternatively,
the asset-choice model cannot be rejected. This
conclusion is invariantacross sample periods. While
the rejection of the intervention model for the float-
ing rate period is not unexpected, it is certainly
interesting that this model is also rejected for the
fixed rate period. This result confirms that the asset-
choice model provides a more general explanation of
central banks’ demand for reserves than does the
intervention model.
~ N—1.N--IARY A.NI) CONC.LU SION
The purpose of this article has been to compare
central bank behavior before and after the move-
silent to floating exchange rates within the frame-
work of two alternative models of a central bank’s
demand for foreign reserves. In the first model,
necessary eonchtion for the use ofthis testis that both niodeis
expimuin tlue same depenniesst variable. Imu this ease, the first
eqmuation of the asset-choice modei explains the quantity of
reserves ciemamuded while the inten’enticis, nuodel explains the
lcsgarid/sso rif’th,eqnasutity of nesem-ves demanded. Cninseqsuentlv,
to penfhns,u the Cox test, the asiti—log ofthe intervesution uu~odel
(i.e., a non-lis,ean, Colihi-Dniugias—type fussuetion) is estimated
using a unaximun~-l ikehihood procedure. The resulting pre-
chicted -i-allies andestisnated paranieters are essentiaiiy icles,tieal
to those nihitaim,ech frost a least-squares estisnatiosi of the iog—
hnear fsunctiom,ai fiimnu.





0 ~In y -- -
+
1
lf(mA~) — g(d,,-iss)l’E1~(~s g(’~Ao)i
T = sanupie size,
estin,atenl varia,nce ofthe mnsidei usnder
Hss,




the residuals from,, an auxiliary esti-
sssation of ti,e snochei under H
5
musing
the predicted valises frost the m,,odei
under Ho as tlue rhependeu~t
variable,
Van (T0) = tl~evariassee of T
0
as defines1 in
Pesaras, and Deaton, ‘Testing Non-
Nested Nonlinear Regression
Models,’ p. 687.
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foreign reserves are treated as a special type ofasset,
omie demanded solel~-to enable a central hank to
intervene in foreign currency markets. The second
model considers foreign reserves to be the same as —
and also to he held for the same reasons as any
other asset within a central bank’s portfolio.
The estimation of the asset-choice nuodel as an
alternative to the intervention model yielded several
interesting results. First, acentral bank’s demand for
foreign reserves is sensitive to relative changes in
the yields of the assets in the portfolio. Second,
central banks consider foreign reserves as substi-
totes to other assets in their portfolio, Third, the
decrease in the percentage of the uncommitted
portfolio composed of foreign reserves is identified
as a possible reason for the usual overprediction of
reserve demand by the intervention model in the
floating rate period. Finally-, and sluost importantly,
the asset—choice sluodel cosisistently outperforms the
intervention s,uodlel.
Since the testing procedure employed could lead
to the rejection of both models, the fact that the
asset-choice model cannot he rejected in either
sample period is an extremely robust result. Tise
implication is simply that, regardless of exchange
rate regime, central banks hold foreign reserves fora
wide variety of purposes — not just for intervention
in foreign exchange markets. Consequently, the
investigation of whether or not central banks’
general behaviorhas changed with the movement to
a system of floating exchange rates within the
framework ofthe intervention n,odel appears to be
misdirected. Investigation should focus on the
arguments, instead of the parameters, within the
demand function.
30